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Abstract. We consider the facility location problem in a metric space,
focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported
location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance be-
tween the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in
expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of
utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three
agents on a circle to 7
6
(whereas random dictator obtains 4
3
); and provide
the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in
any metric space, using linear programming.
1 Introduction
In a facility location problem, a central authority faces a set of agents who report
their locations in some space, and needs to decide where to place a facility. It is
typically assumed that each agent i wants the facility to be placed as close as
possible to her own location ai. The challenge is to design a strategyproof mecha-
nism, such that reporting the truthful location is a weakly dominant strategy for
every agent. The designer may have additional goals, where the most common
one is to minimize the utilitarian social cost—the sum of distances to agents’
locations.
Strategyproof facility location mechanisms have been studied at least since
the mid-20th century [Black, 1948]. In 2009, the agenda of approximation mech-
anisms without money was made explicit in a paper by Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [2009, 2013], who used facility location as their primary domain of demon-
stration due to its simplicity. Moreover, facility location is often a bridge between
mechanism design and social choice [Caragiannis et al., 2010, Feldman et al.,
2016, Meir et al., 2012] and has applications to transport [Moujahed et al., 2006],
disaster relief [Florez et al., 2015] and more. Facility location is thus often used
as a testbed for ideas and techniques in mechanism design and noncooperative
multiagent systems.
Most problems that include a single facility are by now well understood. For
example, all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms on continuous and on dis-
crete lines have been characterized [Dokow et al., 2012, Schummer and Vohra,
2004], and it is well known that selecting the median agent location is both
strategyproof and optimal in terms of utilitarian social cost [Moulin, 1980,
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Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009]. One strand of the literature seeks to char-
acterize domains where median-like mechanisms exist [Kalai and Muller, 1977,
Nehring and Puppe, 2007].
For other domains, e.g. graphs that contain cycles, research following [Procaccia and Tennenholtz,
2009] has focused on the minimal social cost that can be guaranteed by strate-
gyproof mechanisms. For deterministic mechanisms even the existence of a single
cycle in a graph entails that any strategyproof mechanism must be dictatorial on
a subdomain, and thus has an approximation ratio that increases linearly with
the number of agents n [Dokow et al., 2012, Schummer and Vohra, 2004]. Many
variations of the problem have since been explored in the AI and multiagent sys-
tems community, including multiple facilities [Anastasiadis and Deligkas, 2018,
Escoffier et al., 2011, Serafino and Ventre, 2015], complex incentives and forms
of strategic behavior [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2017, Sui and Boutilier, 2015, Todo et al.,
2011, Zou and Li, 2015], and alternative design goals [Alon et al., 2010a, Feldman and Wilf,
2013, Mei et al., 2016]. The circle in particular has received much attention in the
facility location literature [Alon et al., 2010a,b, Cai et al., 2016, Dokow et al.,
2012, Schummer and Vohra, 2004], both because it is the simplest graph for
which median-like mechanisms cannot work, and because it is an abstraction of
actual problems like selecting a time-of-the-day or a server in a ring of computers.
Yet, the fundamental strategyproof facility location problem for randomized
mechanisms remains almost unscathed. It is easy to show that the random dic-
tator (RD) mechanism obtains an approximation ratio of 2 − 2n for any metric
space [Alon et al., 2010a, Meir et al., 2012], and of course that 1 is a lower bound.
However except for lines and trees (where the deterministic Median mechanism
is optimal), nothing else is known.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature does not mention mechanisms
that approximate the optimal social cost better than RD even for specific spaces
like the circle, nor is there any lower bound higher than 1.1 The current paper
focuses on narrowing this gap by proving tighter upper and lower bounds for
three agents.
A variant of the problem on which there was more (negative) progress is when
we allow arbitrary constraints on the location of the facility (e.g., where agents
can be placed anywhere on a graph, but only 5 vertices are valid locations for the
facility). In the constrained variant, the RD mechanism obtains 3− 2n approxima-
tion and this is known to be tight for all strategyproof mechanisms. The upper
bound holds for any metric space [Meir et al., 2012], whereas the lower bound
requires specific constructions on the n-dimensional binary cube [Feldman et al.,
2016, Meir et al., 2011]. Anshelevich and Postl [2017] show a smooth transition
of the RD approximation ratio from 2 − 2n to 3 − 2n as the location of the fa-
cility becomes more constrained. See [Meir, 2018] Section 5.3 for an overview of
approximation results for a single facility.
1 Alon et al. [2010a] proposed a randomized strategyproof mechanism specifically for
circles, called the hybrid mechanism. They showed that it obtains the best possible
approximation ratio for the minimax cost, yet for the social cost it achieves a poor
approximation ratio of n−1
2
.
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1.1 Contribution
Our main contribution is the introduction of two randomized mechanisms that
beat the random dictator (RD) mechanism on a circle: the Proportional Circle
Distance (PCD) mechanism, which selects each reported location ai with proba-
bility proportional to the length Li of the arc facing agent i; and the q-Quadratic
Circle Distance mechanism (q-QCD) where the probability of selecting ai is pro-
portional to (max{(Li)2, q2}).
We prove that PCD is strategyproof for any odd number of agents. For 3
agents, we show that PCD obtains an approximation ratio of 54 on the circle
(in contrast to 43 by RD), and has a natural extension that is strategyproof
and weakly dominates RD on any metric space. The 14 -QCD mechanism is also
strategyproof for 3 agents, and obtains an approximation ratio of 76 on the circle.
For any finite graph with m vertices, there is a linear program of polynomial
size that can compute the optimal randomized strategyproof mechanism. We use
such programs to obtain first (but non-tight) lower bounds on the approxima-
tion ratio of any strategyproof mechanism on circles and on general graphs. See
Table 1 for a summary.
Some of our proofs use a combination of formal analysis and computer opti-
mization. All full proofs appear in the appendix. Appendix E contains an anal-
ysis of the multi-dimensional median mechanism for 3 agents on the plane. A
recent working paper by Goel and Hann-Caruthers [2019] solves a more general
problem.
2 Preliminaries
A domain of facility location problems is given by 〈X , d〉, where X is a set,
and d : X × X → R+ is a distance metric. In this paper, X is a (discrete or
continuous) graph, and d(x, y) is the length of the shortest path between x and
y. An instance in the domain 〈X , d〉 is given by a profile a ∈ Xn, where n is the
number of agents (implicit in the profile).
We denote by a−i the partial profile that includes all entries in a except ai.
A n-agent facility location mechanism in domain 〈X , d〉 (or simply a mecha-
nism) is a function f : Xn → ∆(X ), where ∆(X ) is the set of distributions over
X . We denote the resulting lottery of applying f to profile a by fa. Mechanism
f is deterministic if fa is degenerated for any profile a, in which case we denote
fa ∈ X . We denote the probability that mechanism f selects z on profile a by
fa(z) ∈ [0, 1].
When placing a facility on z ∈ X , an agent located at ai suffers a cost of
d(ai, z). We denote by ci(a, h) = Ez∼h[d(ai, z)] the expected cost of agent i in
profile a, when the facility is placed according to lottery h.
The (utilitarian) social cost of lottery h in profile a is denoted by SC(a, h) =∑
i≤n ci(a, h) = Ez∼h[
∑
i≤n d(ai, z)].
We omit the parameter a from the last two definitions when clear from con-
text. We also abuse notation by writing ci(a, z), SC(a, z) for a specific location
z ∈ X rather than a lottery.
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We denote by OPT (a) = infz∈X SC(a, z) the optimal social cost (note that
this is w.l.o.g. obtained in a deterministic location).
2.1 Common Mechanism Properties
A mechanism f is strategyproof if for any profile a ∈ Xn, any agent i, and
any alternative report a′i ∈ X , ci(a, fa) ≤ ci(a, fa−i,a′i) (i.e., i does not gain in
expectation).
A mechanism f is ex-post strategyproof if it is a lottery over strategyproof
deterministic mechanisms. Note that ex-post strategyproofness implies strate-
gyproofness, but not vice versa.
A mechanism f is peaks-only if fa(z) = 0 for all z /∈ a. That is, if the facility
can only be realized on agents’ locations.
Mechanism f dominates mechanism g, if for any profile a, SC(a, fa) ≤
SC(a, ga) and the inequality is strict for at least one profile.
Finally, a mechanism f has an approximation ratio of φ, if for any profile a,
SC(a, fa) ≤ φ · OPT (a).
Familiar mechanisms TheRandom Dictator (RD) mechanism selects each agent i
with equal probability, and places the facility on ai. Clearly RD is ex-post strat-
egyproof, and it is also known to be group-strategyproof [Alon et al., 2010b]
(that is, no subset of agents can gain by a joint deviation). Further, RD has an
approximation ratio of 2− 2n (i.e., 43 for n = 3 agents), and this is tight for any
metric space with at least two distinct locations [Alon et al., 2010a].
On one-dimensional spaces, where agent locations can be sorted, the de-
terministic median mechanism simply picks the location of the median agent.
The median mechanism is strategyproof and optimal [Moulin, 1980]. The median
mechanism also extends to trees, maintaining both properties [Schummer and Vohra,
2004].
3 Circles
A circle is the simplest graph for which there is no median. We denote by CM
the circle graph with M equi-distant vertices V . Assume w.l.o.g. that agents
are indexed in clockwise order. For a profile a ∈ V n, and two consequent agents
j, j+1 (the addition is modulo n), we denote by La(aj , aj+1) (or just L(aj , aj+1)
when the profile is clear from context) the length of the arc between these agents,
that does not contain any other agent. When L(aj , aj+1) is not larger than a
semicircle, then it also coincides with the distance d(aj , aj+1).
We also define Li = L(aj, aj+1) where j = i + ⌊n/2⌋ (modulo n) to be the
length of the arc that is “facing” agent i (although it may not be antipodal).
For 3 agents this simply means that L1 = L(a2, a3), L2 = L(a3, a1), and L3 =
L(a1, a2). Also note that for 3 agents, the optimal location is always the agent
facing the longest arc. See Fig. 1a.
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Figure 1: Examples. (a) The circle C14. Under PCD mechanism, the probabili-
ties that the facility will be realized on a1, a2 and a3, respectively, are (
3
14 ,
9
14 ,
2
14 ).
Under PD, the probabilities are ( 310 ,
5
10 ,
2
10 ). Under
1
4 -QCD, the probabilities are
proportional to ((14 )
2, ( 914 )
2, (14 )
2), which gives us (0.1161, 0.7677, 0.1161). The
other two examples are used in the proof of Theorem 1 (b) and Case I of Theo-
rem 2 (c).
3.1 Proportional Distance
Definition 1. The Proportional Circle Distance (PCD) mechanism assigns the
facility to each location ai w.p.
Li∑
j≤n Lj
.
Theorem 1. PCD is strategyproof for any odd n.
Proof sketch. Suppose that a1 tries the manipulate by moving (w.l.o.g.) clockwise
to a′1. Note that the probability of selecting agent 1 is not affected. Thus the
agent’s gain comes from increasing the selection probability of a closer agent at
the expense of a farther agent. On the other hand, the agent’s cost increases
proportionally to her distance from her true location, and we show that this
factor is more prominent. 
For 3 agents, the PCD mechanism guarantees an approximation ratio of
5
4 = 1.25. This is not hard to show, but will also follow from stronger results in
Section 4. In Section 3.3 we further discuss what we know when n > 3.
3.2 The Quadratic Distance Mechanism
Since the optimal location with 3 agents is always the peak facing the longest arc,
to improve the approximation ratio we must put more weight on peaks facing
long arcs (at least in the “bad” instances).
Definition 2. The q-Quadratic Circle Distance (q-QCD) mechanism considers
the arc lengths L1, L2, L3. It then assigns the facility to ai w.p. proportional to
si = max{(Li)2, q2}.
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That is, q puts a lower bound on the probability that each agent is selected.
Theorem 2. The 14 -QCD mechanism is strategyproof.
Proof sketch. We denote x = L2, z = L3 and y = L1. We denote by sx, sy, sz
the un-normalized weight assigned to the agent facing each respective arc, and
by pi =
si
s where s = s1 + s2 + s3 the actual probability that i is selected. Note
that px + py + pz = 1. The notations are demonstrated on Fig. 1c
The cost to agent 1 can be written as
c1 = pxz + pzx =
sxz + szx
sx + sy + sz
.
Consider a step of size ε by agent 1 towards agent 3. Intuitively, moving towards
the far agent only increases its probability of selection and is thus never beneficial
for agent 1. Thus w.l.o.g. z ≥ x ≥ ε.
The move changes the arc lengths from (x, y, z) to (x − ε, y, z + ε), and the
cost changes accordingly to
c′1 = p
′
xz + p
′
zx+ p
′
yε =
sx−εz + sz+εx+ syε
sx−ε + sy + sz+ε
. (1)
Our general strategy is to write the new cost c′1 as
c′1 =
sxz + szx+ εγ
sx + sy + sz + εθ
=
c1s+ εγ
s+ εθ
, (2)
where γ, θ ≥ 0. Then, we show that γθ ≥ sxz+szxsx+sy+sz (= c1). This would conclude
the proof, as it means that agent 1 does not gain:
c′1 =
sx−εz + sz+εx+ syε
sx−ε + sy + sz+ε
≥ c1s+ εc1θ
s+ εθ
=
c1(s+ εθ)
s+ εθ
= c1. (3)
The exact values of γ, θ depend on whether x − ε ≥ q (Case I, see Fig. 1c),
x ≥ q > x − ε (Case II), or q > x (Case III). We only show here Case I, which
captures most of the proof’s ideas. The proofs of the other cases are similar,
with some caveats.
Suppose first that y ≥ q = 14 and that z ≤ 12 (we later show this does not
matter). Then sx = x
2, sy = y
2, sz = z
2, and
c1 = pxz + pzx =
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + y2
.
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After the move, we have s′x = (x − ε)2, s′z = (z + ε)2, s′y = sy = y2. Plugging
into Eq. (1),
c′1 =
(x− ε)2z + (z + ε)2x+ y2ε
(x− ε)2 + (z + ε)2 + y2
=
x2z − 2εxz + ε2z + z2x+ 2εzx+ ε2x+ y2ε
x2 − 2εx+ ε2 + z2 + 2εz + ε2 + y2
=
x2z + z2x+ ε(y2 + ε(z + x))
x2 + z2 + y2 + 2ε(z − x+ ε) =
c1s+ εγ
s+ εθ
.
It is worthwhile to take a step back and consider what we got so far. Note that
γ in the nominator is always positive because the (linear) derivatives of the
quadratic terms sxz, szx cancel out. This shows why using quadratic probabili-
ties makes sense. However, this is not sufficient, since θ in the denominator is also
positive, and when sy is too small (specifically, smaller than
1
16 ) then the nomi-
nator grows too slowly to counter the increase in the denominator. This explains
why we need the parameter q—to make sure that the manipulator is selected
with sufficient probability to counter the benefit of the increased probability of
the agent that is closer to a1.
Going back to the technical proof, we need to show that
γ
θ
=
y2 + ε(z + x)
2(z − x+ ε) ≥
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + y2
.
Rearranging, we should prove that
(y2 + ε(z + x))(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)(2(z − x+ ε)) (4)
is non-negative. It is easy to see that this expression is monotonically increasing
in y (and y ≥ 14 in this case). It is a bit less easy to see (not shown here)
that it is also monotonically increasing in ε. Thus it is sufficient to lower bound
( 116 + x(z + x))(x
2 + z2 + 116 )− (x2z + z2x)2(z − x+ x), or, equivalently,
(
1
16
+ xz + x2)(x2 + z2 +
1
16
)− 2z2x(x+ z).
One can check that the minimum of this expression in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ z ≤ 12
is exactly 0 (at z = 12 , x =
1
4 ).
2 Thus γθ ≥ c1, and we are done by Eq. (3).
Finally, suppose that z > 12 . The only change is that the underlined z in
Eq. (4) would change to x+ y (which is smaller than z). This only increases the
expression and would thus not make it negative. 
Since the inequality we get in Eq. (4) is tight, the proof also shows that any
q-QCD mechanism for q < 14 would not be strategyproof.
2 We verified this with Wolfram Alpha.
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Proposition 3 The 14 -QCD mechanism has an approximation ratio of
7
6
∼=
1.166, and this is tight.
Proof. Let a = (a1, a2, a3) be a profile, and denote x = d(a1, a2), y = d(a2, a3), z =
d(a1, a3). We assume w.l.o.g. z ≥ y ≥ x, thus the optimal point is a2. The opti-
mal social cost is x+ y.
We first argue that the approximation only becomes worse by moving a2
to the mid point between her neighbors. By decreasing y to y′ = y − ε and
increasing x to x′ = x + ε, z remains the largest arc, so a2 is still optimal and
x′ + y′ = x+ y is still the optimal social cost. The social cost of the mechanism
changes from
sx(y+z)+sy(x+z)+sz(x+y)
sx+sy+sz
to
s′x(y+z)+s
′
y(x+z)+sz(x+y)
s′x+s
′
y+sz
. We have that
s′x+ s
′
y ≤ sx+ sy since the new partition is more balanced. This means that the
denominator weakly increases and the total weight pz given to the optimal point
a2 can only decrease. Among the two non optimal points, note that a3 has the
higher cost (z+y ≥ z+x). Now, s′x ≥ sx so the relative weight of the worst point
a3 only increases. Thus the social cost weakly increases and the approximation
ratio becomes worse.
This means that we are left to find the worst instance among the instances
with distances (x, x, 1 − 2x) for some x ≤ 13 . The optimum in such an instance
is 2x whereas the social cost of 14 -QCD is:
– for 13 ≥ x ≥ 14 , we have in particular that 1− 2x ≥ 13 > 14 . Then
SC =
2x2(x+ (1− 2x)) + (1 − 2x)22x
2x2 + (1− 2x)2 =
2x− 6x2 + 6x3
1− 4x+ 6x2
and the approximation ratio is 1−3x+3x
2
1−4x+6x2 . The derivative of this expression is
negative for x < 12 so it is maximized at the bottom of the range, at x =
1
4 .
– for x ≤ 14 , we have that
SC =
2(1/4)23x+ (1− 2x)22x
2(1/4)2 + (1− 2x)2 ,
and the approximation ratio is 3/16+(1−2x)
2
2/16+(1−2x)2 , which is increasing in x, so once
again we obtain the maximum at x = 14 .
Plugging x = 14 to the expression of the approximation ratio above, we get that
in the worst instance a = (0, 14 ,
1
2 ),
1
4 -QCD obtains an approximation ratio of
exactly 3/16+(1/2)
2
2/16+(1/2)2 =
7
6 . 
3.3 Beyond 3 agents
We already saw that the PCD mechanism is strategyproof for any odd n. How-
ever, calculating its worst-case approximation ratio is more tricky. In particular,
the worst instance is not symmetric w.r.t. the optimal point (in contrast to 3
agents). In the limit, PCD and random dictator have the same approximation:
Proposition 4 When n grows, the approximation ratio of PCD approaches 2.
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Proof. Let n = 2k + 1, and consider the profile in Fig. 2a, where x = 1
4
√
k
. The
numbers inside the circle indicate the number of agents in each location.
The optimal point is the bottom concentration, with a social cost of c1 =
kx + 12 − x ≤ 14
√
k + 12 . The social cost of the left point is c2 = k(
1
2 − x) + k 12 ,
and of the right point is c3 = kx+
1
2 . Thus
SC(fPCD(a)) =
1
2
c1 + xc2 + (
1
2
− x)c3 = −2kx2 + (2k − 1)x+ 1
2
= −1
8
+
1
2
√
k − 1
4
√
k
+
1
2
≥ 1
2
√
k,
and thus the approximation ratio is at least
1
2
√
k
1
4
√
k+ 1
2
> 2− 8√
n
. 
It is an open question whether there is some mechanism (perhaps a variation
of q-QCD) that strictly beats 2 approximation for any n. We believe that this is
indeed the case but that would require simplifying the proof technique.
Peak-only restrictions We prove a weaker version of the following:
Conjecture 5 For any n, the best strategyproof mechanism is peaks-only.
Proposition 6 For any n, the optimal strategyproof mechanism w.l.o.g. only
places the facility either on peaks, or on points antipodal to peaks.
Proof sketch. For a profile a = (a1, . . . , an), denote by bi the point antipodal to
ai, and let A = {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn}. Suppose that in some some profile a,
the mechanism f places the facility with some probability p on point α /∈ A.
Denote by β, γ the nearest points to α from A clockwise and counterclockwise,
respectively. Let x = d(α, β), y = d(α, γ) (see Fig. 2b).
We define a mechanism f ′ that is identical to f , except that it “splits” the
probability mass p of α between the adjacent points β, γ: it sets f ′
a
(α) = 0;
f ′
a
(β) = fa(β) + p
y
x+y ; and f
′
a
(γ) = fa(γ) + p
x
x+y .
We claim that for any agent i, ci(a, fa) = ci(a, f
′(a)). This would show both
that f ′ is strategyproof (since f is) and that SC(a, fa) = SC(a, f ′(a)) for all
a.
Indeed, consider some agent placed at ai. From the three points α, β, γ, the
one farthest from ai cannot be α, since this would mean that bi (the point antipo-
dal to ai) is strictly in the open interval (β, γ), whereas by construction there are
no more points from A in this interval. Thus w.l.o.g. d(ai, β) < d(ai, α) < d(ai, γ)
(see figure). We omit the rest of the proof, which is not hard. 
4 Beyond Circles
Definition 3. The Proportional Distance (PD) mechanism for three agents se-
lects each ai (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) with probability proportional to the distance between
the other pair of agents.
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Figure 2: Figures used in the proofs of Prop. 4 (a) and Prop. 6 (b).
Note that for three agents on a circle, PD and PCD coincide when the agents
are not all on the same semicircle, and otherwise PCD gives higher probability
to the “middle” agent (which is optimal). Therefore PCD dominates PD. See
Fig. 1a for an example. It is also not hard to show that PD dominates RD on
any metric space. In particular, this means that SC(fPD
a
) ≤ 43OPT (a) on any
graph.
Theorem 7. The PD mechanism is strategyproof in expectation for 3 agents in
any metric space (in particular on any graph).
In contrast to Theorem 1, the proof is rather technical and is thus omitted.
Observation 8 The approximation ratio of any peaks-only mechanism (regard-
less of its incentive properties) on a general graph is at least 43 (2− 2n for general
n).
To see why, consider a star graph with n leafs, each containing one agent.
Proposition 9 Let f be any peaks-only mechanism. Then for any profile a ∈
V 3, we have that SC(fPD
a
) ≤ 54SC(fa), and this bound is tight.
Proof. Consider the distances between pairs x ≤ y ≤ z. W.l.o.g. we can denote
x + y = 1. By triangle inequality, z ≤ x + y = 1. The optimal peak location
yields a cost of x+ y = 1. The PD mechanism yields a cost of
SC(fPD) =
x(y + z)
x+ y + z
+
y(x+ z)
x+ y + z
+
z(x+ y)
x+ y + z
=
2xy + xz + yz + z
1 + z
= 2
xy + z
1 + z
≤ 2xy + 1
1 + 1
= xy + 1 ≤ (0.5)2 + 1 = 5
4
,
as required.
For tightness, consider any domain that contains three points a1, a2, a3 such
that a2 is in the middle between a1 and a3 (e.g., a line). If there is one agent
on each point then x = d(a1, a2) = d(a2, a3) = y = 0.5 whereas z = d(a1, a3) =
x + y = 1. Then SC(fPD(a)) = 2xy+z1+z = 1.25 = 1.25OPT (a), as the optimal
peaks-only mechanism will select a2. 
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Since the optimal point on a circle is always a peak, and since PCD dominates
PD, we get the following.
Corollary 10 For 3 agents on a circle, the PD and PCD mechanisms have an
approximation ratio of 54 , and this is tight.
Remark 1. Since d(a1, a2) + d(a2, a3) + d(a3, a1) is a constant D given the pro-
file, the PD mechanism selects each agent i with probability proportional to
D − SC(ai). This allows us to easily extends the PD mechanism to any n, and
it remains an open question whether the PD mechanism remains strategyproof.
Recall however that already on the circle, PCD dominates PD, and is not asymp-
totically better than random dictator.
In [Escoffier et al., 2011], the authors suggest a randomized mechanism for
placing n− 1 facilities based on a similar idea: they place facilities on all agents
except one (assuming all locations are distinct), where the placement omitted
location ai is selected with probability inversely proportional to the social cost
of this placement (which in their case is just the distance to the closest agent
j 6= i), and show it is strategyproof for any n and any metric space. Further,
the inversely proportional mechanism is asymptotically better than randomly
omitting a facility, which cannot guaranty any bounded approximation. An-
other mechanism that uses a similar proportional lottery (for two facilities) is in
[Lu et al., 2010].
This suggest another possible direction for a the single facility problem (or
perhaps to more general problems), by considering various probabilities that are
proportional to some decreasing function of the social cost.3
4.1 Lower Bounds via Linear Programming
An immediate corollary from Prop. 6, is that in that any upper bound on con-
tinuous circles implies the same upper bound on any finite circle with an even
number of nodes, and thus any lower bound on a finite circle of any even size
(or any size if Conj. 5 is true) implies a lower bound for continuous circles.
It is well known that mechanism design problems for finite domains can be
written as linear programs [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Automated mecha-
nism design had also been applied to facility location problems, for one or more
facilities on a line [Golowich et al., 2018, Narasimhan et al., 2016]. Due to the
specifics of the problems they considered, they used advanced machine learning
techniques rather than linear programming.
For a given graph (V,E), finding the optimal randomized strategyproof mech-
anism for three agents can be written as a simple linear optimization program
as follows. There are |V |4 + 1 variables: (pa,z)a∈V 3,z∈V , where pa,z = fa(z) is
the probability that the facility is placed on z in profile a; and α ∈ R which is
the approximation factor. The optimization goal is simply to minimize α. There
are four types of constraints:
3 Note that using the reciprocal of the social cost (as in [Escoffier et al., 2011]) would
lead to a poor outcome in the single facility problem.
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v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6
Figure 3: A graph for which the best approximation ratio is 1312 . The three solid
edges have length 1, all dashed edges have length 2.
1. Feasibility constraints: pa,z ≥ 0 for all a ∈ V 3, z ∈ V ;
2. Probability constraints:
∑
z∈V pa,z = 1 for all a ∈ V 3;
3. Incentive constraints: For every profile a ∈ V 3, any agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
any alternative location a′i ∈ V , we want to enforce the constraint ci(a, fa) ≤
ci(a, f(a−i,a′i)). This can be written as the following linear inequality over
2|V | variables:
∑
z∈V
d(z, ai)pa,z ≤
∑
z∈V
d(z, ai)p(a−i,a′i),z.
4. Approximation constraints: For every profile a ∈ V 3, we want to enforce the
approximation SC(a, fa) ≤ α·OPT (a). SinceOPT (a) = minz∈V
∑
i∈{1,2,3} d(z, ai)
can be computed once for each profile, the approximation constraint can also
be written as a linear inequality:
∑
i∈{1,2,3}
∑
z∈V
d(z, ai)pa,z ≤ α ·min
z∈V
∑
i∈{1,2,3}
d(z, ai).
In total, we get a bit more than 3|V |4 linear constraints. This is feasible for
small graphs with commercial solvers, especially such that handle well sparse
constraint matrices (we used Matlab’s linprog function).
Theorem 11. There is no strategyproof mechanism for arbitrary graphs whose
approximation ratio is better than 1312
∼= 1.0833.
Proof. By coding the graph in Fig. 3, and using Matlab to solve the correspond-
ing linear program. 
Small circles
Lemma 12 For any strategyproof [peaks-only] mechanism f on the circle, there
is a neutral and anonymous strategyproof [peaks-only] g,4 such that maxa SC(ga) ≤
maxa′ SC(fa′).
4 A mechanism is neutral if it is invariant to renaming of vertices, and anonymous if
it is invariant to renaming of agents.
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Proof. Mechanism g simply selects a permutation over agents uniformly at ran-
dom, and direction+rotation for the circle uniformly at random, thereby map-
ping profile a to aˆ. Then, it runs f on aˆ and maps back the outcome. Since this
is a lottery over strategyproof mechanisms, it must also be strategyproof. It is
also easy to see that if f is peaks-only then so is g. Finally, for any profile a,
SC(ga) is averaging over several variations of SC(faˆ), all of which are bounded
by maxa′ SC(fa′). 
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Figure 4: The worst-case approximation ratio of the optimal 3-agent facil-
ity location mechanism on a circle with up to 44 vertices. The dashed part is
computed only for peaks-only mechanisms on even M .
Theorem 13. There is no strategyproof mechanism for circle graphs whose ap-
proximation ratio is better than 1.0456. If we add the peaks-only requirement,
the lower bound is 1.0523.
To prove the theorem, we coded two linear programs: one that computes the
optimal mechanism, and one that computes the optimal peaks-only mechanism.
Since the number of variables for a circle with M vertices is M4 (or 3M3 for
peaks-only mechanisms) increases too fast for efficiently solving except for very
small graphs, we applied the following improvements:
– By Lemma 12, it is sufficient to check mechanisms that are neutral. We thus
fixed the location of the first agent, which reduces the number of variables
by a factor of M .
– Also by Lemma 12, it is sufficient to check mechanisms that are anonymous.
This allows us to add many symmetry constraints (both within profiles and
between profiles) that effectively reduce the number of variables even more.
– By Prop. 6, it is sufficient to consider mechanisms that place the facility on
one of the 6 peaks or anti-peaks.
14 R. Meir
This enables us to solve the obtained program for all mechanism on circles up to
M = 28, and the program for peaks-only mechanisms for circles up to M = 44.
We note that the worst-case approximation bounds in both programs are the
same for any |V | ≤ 28, which supports Conjecture 5, but leaves the proof as
a challenge. The worst-case approximation ratios of the optimal mechanism for
finite circles are shown in Figure 4. It is non-monotone due to parity effects.
It remains an open question whether there is a better mechanism than the 14 -
QCD mechanism for circles of arbitrary size, and what is the best approximation
ratio that can be guaranteed. While we improved the upper bound from 43 to
7
6 , and the lower bound from 1 to the bounds in Theorem 13, there is still a
non-negligible gap.
5 Discussion
Table 1 summarizes our results for randomized mechanisms, and put them in the
context of known bounds. It remains an open question whether the upper bound
of 43 (2− 2n for general n) is tight, and in particular whether general graphs are
more difficult than circles.
The effect of the circle size on the available strategyproof mechanisms was ev-
ident in [Dokow et al., 2012]. There, they showed (also using a computer search)
a sharp dichotomy, where up to a certain size there are deterministic anonymous
mechanisms, and above that size any strategyproof onto mechanism must be
near-dictatorial. With randomized mechanisms, we see a more gradual effect.
The mechanisms we present seem quite specific to the problem at hand. Thus
a natural question is what can be the takeaway messages for readers from the
broader community of algorithmic game theory? We believe there are two.
First, the idea of focusing on the derivative of assignment probabilities as
agents change their reported values. In the case of facility location, misreport-
ing a value (say, by ε) causes the manipulator direct harm that is linear in ε,
but may change the outcome probabilities in a way that still makes the ma-
nipulation beneficial. However, since the benefit is proportional to the change
in probabilities (i.e., to their derivatives), using quadratic probabilities (whose
derivatives are linear) puts the harm and benefit on the same scale. It is then
left to the designer to tweak the parameters of the mechanism so as to make
sure that the gain of a manipulator never exceeds the harm. Therefore, while
the q-QCD mechanism seems more complicated than PCD and is more difficult
to technically analyze, in a sense it is the result of a more structured and general
approach to the problem, whereas PCD is a nice curiosity that happens to work.
The second idea is the combination of analytic and computational tools for
solving a difficult design problem. While in some cases (e.g. in the analysis of
our PD and PCD mechanisms) all the terms in the equations nicely cancel out
to leave us with a clean proof, this is not always so. On the other hand, fully
automated mechanism design [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002] typically explodes
with the size of the problem and leaves us with a solution that cannot be easily
explained, modified or adapted to similar problems. This is true even for our
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metric space Any Circle
Random Dictator 4
3
∼= 1.333 (*) 4
3
∼= 1.333 (*)
Proportional [Circle] Distance 4
3
∼= 1.333 (#) 5
4
= 1.25 (Cor. 10)
1
4
-Quadratic Circle Distance - 7
6
∼= 1.166 (Thm. 2,Prop. 3)
best UB 1.333 (RD/PD) 1.166 ( 1
4
-QCD)
LB (peaks-only) 1.333 (Ob. 8) 1.0523 (Thm. 13)
LB 13
12
∼= 1.0833 (Prop. 11) 1.0456 (Thm. 13)
Table 1: A summary of approximation bounds for 3-agent randomized mech-
anisms. (*) - from [Alon et al., 2010a]. (#) - obtains 54 = 1.25 approximation
from best peak (Prop. 9).
linear programming approach in Section 4.1. However, one can come up with
a specific or parametrized class of mechanisms, and use the computer capabil-
ities to prove certain difficult inequalities, optimize parameters, or test various
conjectures before setting out to prove them analytically. A similar combined ap-
proach has been applied e.g. in auctions [Guo and Conitzer, 2010], albeit with
very different mechanisms.
We leave many open questions for future research. In particular, whether the
PD and QCD mechanisms can be generalized for more agents, and whether there
are classes of graphs that are inherently more difficult than circles.
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Figure 5: Examples used in proof of Theorem 1 (left) and Case I of Theorem 2
(right).
A PCD
Theorem 1.PCD is strategyproof for any odd n.
Proof. Suppose that a1 tries the manipulate by moving (w.l.o.g.) clockwise to a
′′
1 .
Let k be the first index such that a′′1 > ak and a
′′
1 is a beneficial manipulation
(it is possible that k = 1). Denote a′1 = ak and a
′ = (a′1, a2, . . . , an),a
′′ =
(a′′1 , a2, . . . , an). Denote h = fa, h
′ = fa′ and h′′ = fa′′ , where f is the PCD
mechanism. Next, denote ε = a′′1 − a′1, and consider the step where agent 1
moves from a′1 to a
′′
1 (see Fig. 5, left). This move changes the outcome from h
′
to h′′ and has two effects. First, it affects the selection probabilities (only) of
ai, ai+1 where i = (n− 1)/2+ k− 1, and w.l.o.g. ai is closer to a1 (otherwise the
move is not beneficial). Second, it inflicts a cost of ε w.p. L(ai, ai+1) (that is, in
all realizations where agent 1 is selected). We need to show that the expected
gain when moving from a′1 to a
′′
1 is upper bounded by the expected cost.
gain = (h′(ai)−h
′′(ai))d(ai, a1) + (h
′(ai+1)−h
′′(ai+1))d(ai+1, a1)
= εd(ai, a1) + (−ε)d(ai+1, a1) = ε(d(ai, a1)− d(ai+1, a1))
≤ εd(ai, ai+1) ≤ εL(ai, ai+1) = cost (triangle inequality)
Thus, c1(a, h
′′) = c1(a, h′) + cost − gain ≥ c1(a, h′) ≥ c1(a, h), where the
last inequality is by our minimality assumption.
B q-QCD
Theorem 2. The 14 -QCD mechanism is strategyproof.
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Proof. We denote by x, z the lengths of the arcs adjacent to a1, and by y the
arc facing a1. We denote by sx, sy, sz the un-normalized weight assigned to the
agent facing each respective arc, and by pi =
si
s1+s2+s3
the actual probability
that i is selected. Note that px + py + pz = 1.
The cost to agent 1 can be written as
c1 = pxz + pzx =
sxz + szx
sx + sy + sz
.
Consider a step of size ε ≤ x by agent 1. This changes the arc lengths from
(x, y, z) to (x− ε, y, z + ε). The cost changes accordingly to
c′1 = p
′
xz + p
′
zx+ p
′
yε =
sx−εz + sz+εx+ syε
sx−ε + sy + sz+ε
.
Note that sx−ε ≤ sx, sz+ε ≥ sz. Also, the denominator is larger as the partition
of the circle is more unbalanced. Moving towards the farther agent always in-
creases the cost (as it increases the nominator, and decreases the denominator
of c′1), so it cannot be a manipulation.
For the same reason, if ε > x then moving from a1 + x to a1 + ε only hurts
agent 1, since she is moving towards the far agent.
Thus w.l.o.g. z ≥ x ≥ ε. Our general strategy is to write the new cost c′1 as
c′1 =
sxz + szx+ εγ
sx + sy + sz + εθ
=
c1s+ εγ
s+ εθ
, (5)
where γ, t ≥ 0. Then, we show that γθ ≥ sxz+szxsx+sy+sz (= c1). This means that
c′1 ≥
c1s+ εc1θ
s+ εθ
=
c1(s+ εθ)
s+ εθ
= c1.
The change in probabilities depends on the following cases.
Case 1: x − ε ≥ q. Suppose first that y ≥ q = 14 and that z ≤ 12 (we later
show this does not matter). Then px ∼ x2, py ∼ y2, pz ∼ z2; and p′x ∼
(x− ε)2, p′z ∼ (z + ε)2, p′y ∼ y2.
c1 = pxz + pzx =
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + y2
.
After the move, we have
c′1 = p
′
xz + p
′
zx+ p
′
yε =
(x− ε)2z + (z + ε)2x+ y2ε
(x − ε)2 + (z + ε)2 + y2
=
x2z − 2εxz + ε2z + z2x+ 2εzx+ ε2x+ y2ε
x2 − 2εx+ ε2 + z2 + 2εz + ε2 + y2
=
x2z + z2x+ ε(y2 + ε(z + x))
x2 + z2 + y2 + 2ε(z − x+ ε) .
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So in this case we need to show that
γ
θ
=
y2 + ε(z + x)
2(z − x+ ε) ≥
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + y2
.
Rearranging, we should prove that
(y2 + ε(z + x))(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)(2(z − x+ ε)) (6)
is non-negative. It is easy to see that this expression is monotonically in-
creasing in y (and y ≥ 14 in this case). It is a bit less easy to see that it is
also monotonically increasing in ε:
(y2 + ε(z + x))(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)(2(z − x+ ε))
= y2(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)2(z − x) + ε[(z + x)(x2 + z2 + y2)− 2(x2z + z2x)]
= y2(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)2(z − x) + ε[zx2 + x3 + xz2 + z3 + (z + x)y2)− 2(x2z + z2x)]
≥ y2(x2 + z2 + y2)− (x2z + z2x)2(z − x) + ε[(x2x+ z2z)− (x2z + z2x)],
since the term in square brackets is nonnegative due to z ≥ x, z2 ≥ x2. Thus
it is sufficient to lower bound
(
1
16
+x(z+x))(x2+z2+
1
16
)−(x2z+z2x)2(z−x+x) = ( 1
16
+xz+x2))(x2+z2+
1
16
)−2z2x(x+z).
One can check that the minimum of this expression in the range 0 ≤ x ≤
z ≤ 12 is exactly 0 (at z = 12 , x = 14 ).5 Thus
c′1 ≥
x2z + z2x+ ε(q2 + ε(z + x))
x2 + z2 + q2 + 2ε(z − x+ ε) ≥
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + y2
= c1. (7)
Finally, suppose that z > 12 . The only change is that the bold z in Eq. (6)
would change to x + y (which is smaller than z). This only increases the
expression and would thus not make it negative.
Case 2: x ≥ q > x− ε. As in Case 1, we may assume w.l.o.g. that z ≤ 12 (and
handle the complimentary case in the same way). Then px ∼ x2, pz ∼ z2;
and p′x ∼ q2, p′z ∼ (z+ ε)2. The difference from Case 1 is that p′x = q2 rather
than (x− ε)2. Denote δ = x− q < ε, then
c′1 = p
′
xz + p
′
zx+ p
′
yε =
(x − δ)2z + (z + ε)2x+ y2ε
(x− δ)2 + (z + ε)2 + y2
=
x2z − 2δxz + δ2z + z2x+ 2εzx+ ε2x+ y2ε
x2 − 2δx+ δ2 + z2 + 2εz + ε2 + y2
=
x2z + z2x+ ε(2zx+ εx+ y2) + δ(−2xz + δz)
x2 + z2 + y2 + ε(2z + ε) + δ(−2x+ δ)
≥ x
2z + z2x+ ε(2zx+ εx+ q2) + δ(−2xz + δz)
x2 + z2 + q2 + ε(2z + ε) + δ(−2x+ δ)
(as in case 1, w.l.o.g. py = p
′
y = q
2)
5 We verified this with Wolfram Alpha.
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So the expression we need to lower bound is a bit more complicated. Note
that the δ multiplier in the nominator is exactly the one in the denominator
multiplied by z. The ε multiplier is multiplied by xˆ := 2zx+εx+q
2
2z+ε > x. So we
can rewrite c′1 as
c′1 =
x2z + z2x+ εxˆαε − δzβδ
x2 + z2 + q2 + εαε − δβδ ,
where αε = 2z + ε, βδ = 2z − δ. It is easy to check that ε · αε, δ · βδ are
positive and monotonically increasing in their respective arguments ε, δ. We
argue that
x2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + q2
≤ x. (8)
Indeed, divide both sides by x, then
z2 + xz
z2 + x2 + q2
≤ z
2 + x2 + x(z − x)
z2 + x2 + q2
≤ z
2 + x2 + (z/2)2
z2 + x2 + q2
≤ 1,
where the last inequality is since z ≤ 12 = 2q.
We now further subdivide into 2 cases. The simple case is when z ≥ xˆ.
z ≥ xˆ > x ≥ x
2z + z2x
x2 + z2 + q2
⇒ (by Eq. (8))
c′1 ≥
x2z + z2x+ εxˆαε − δzβδ
x2 + z2 + q2 + εαε − δβδ
≥ x
2z + z2x+ εxˆαε − εzβε
x2 + z2 + q2 + εαε − εβε
=
x2z + z2x+ ε(q2 + ε(z + x))
x2 + z2 + q2 + 2ε(z − x+ ε) ≥ c1 (by Eq. (7))
The uglier case is when z < xˆ. First, observe that
z ≤ xˆ = 2zx+ εx+ q
2
2z + ε
= x+
q2
2z + ε
≤ x+ 1
32z
,
that is, x, z must be quite close to one another. Now,
c′1 ≥
x2z + z2x+ εxˆαε − δzβδ
x2 + z2 + q2 + εαε − δβδ
>
x2z + z2x+ εxαε − δzβδ
x2 + z2 + q2 + εαε − δβδ (xˆ > x)
=
x2z + z2x+ ε(q2 + ε(z + x))
x2 + z2 + q2 + 2ε(z − x+ ε) .
We got an expression that is strictly smaller than the one we had in Eq. (7)
so we cannot use our previous result from Case 1. However, we can feed it
again into Wolfram Alpha, with the additional constraint z ≥ x + 132z and
verify that it is still always larger than c1.
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Case 3: q ≥ x > x − ε. Then px ∼ q2, py ∼ y2, pz ∼ z2; and p′x ∼ q2, p′z ∼
(z + ε)2, p′y ∼ y2. Also suppose first y ≤ q. Thus z ≥ 12 x+y. This means that
c1 =
sx(x+ y) + szx
sx + sy + sz
=
q2(x+ y) + z2x
2q2 + z2
,
and
c′1 =
q2(x+ y) + (z + ε)2x+ εq2
2q2 + (z + ε)2
=
q2(x+ y) + z2x+ ε(2zx+ εx+ q2)
2q2 + z2 + ε(2z + ε)
Bounding the ratios of nominator and denominator factors:
2zx+ εx+ q2
2z + ε
≥ 2zx+ εx
2z + ε
= x,
c1 =
q2(x+ y) + z2x
2q2 + z2
≤ q
2(2x) + z2x
2q2 + z2
= x.
If y ≥ q, then
c′1 =
q2min{z, x+ y}+ z2x+ ε(2zx+ εx+ y2)
q2 + y2 + z2 + ε(2z + ε)
2zx+ εx+ y2
2z + ε
= x+
y2
2z + ε
≥ x+ y
1
4
z + (x+ z)
≥ x+ y
8
,
c1 ≤ q
2(x+ y) + z2x
q2 + y2 + z2
≤ q
2x+ z2x
q2 + y2 + z2
+
yq2
q2 + y2 + z2
≤ q
2x+ z2x
q2 + z2
+
y 116
q2 + y2 + z2
≤ x+ y 1
16(q2) + 2(1−q2 )
2
= x+ y
1
16 464 + 2
9
64
= x+
y
5.5
< x+
y
8
.
Thus in either case, c′1 ≥ c1.
Proposition 3. The 14 -QCD mechanism has an approximation ratio of
7
6
∼=
1.166, and this is tight.
Proof sketch. Let a = (a1, a2, a3) be a profile, and denote x = d(a1, a2), y =
d(a2, a3), z = d(a1, a3). We assume w.l.o.g. z ≥ y ≥ x, thus the optimal point is
a2. The optimal social cost is x+ y.
We first argue that the approximation only becomes worse by moving a2 to
the mid point between her neighbors. This means that we are left to find the
worst instance among the instances with distances (x, x, 1− 2x) for some x ≤ 13 .
The optimum in such an instance is 2x whereas the social cost of 14 -QCD can
now also be expresses as a function of x (the expression differs when x < 13 and
x > 13 ). This means we can write the approximation ratio as a function of x,
and get the lower bound by plugging in x = 14 .
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C Beyond 3 agents
We have several conjectures regarding a general number of agents on the circle.
First, regarding the general version of the PCD mechanism.
Conjecture 14 The worst approximation ratio is obtained when all points are
on the same semi-circle.
Next, we consider arbitrary mechanisms for n agents.
Conjecture 5. For any n, the best strategyproof mechanism is peaks-only.
We can prove a somewhat weaker result:
Proposition 6. For any n, the optimal strategyproof mechanism w.l.o.g. only
places the facility either on peaks, or on points antipodal to peaks.
Proof. In this proof we use the notation f(a) instead of fa, and use pf (x) as
the probability that f returns x (when the profile is clear from context). For
a profile a = (a1, . . . , an), denote by bi the point antipodal to ai, and let A =
{a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn}. Suppose that in some some profile a, the mechanism
f places the facility with some probability p on point α /∈ A. Denote by β, γ
the nearest points from A clockwise and counterclockwise, respectively. Let x =
d(α, β), y = d(α, γ).
We define a mechanism f ′ that is identical to f , except that instead of setting
pf (α) = p, it sets pf ′(α) = 0; pf ′(β) = pf (β)+p
y
x+y ; and pf ′(γ) = pf (γ)+p
x
x+y
(we apply this at all profiles).
We claim that for any agent i, ci(f(a)) = ci(f
′(a)). This would show both
that f ′ is strategyproof (since f is) and that SC(f(a),a) = SC(f ′(a),a) for all
a.
Indeed, consider some agent placed at ai. From the three points α, β, γ, the
one farthest from ai cannot be α, since this would mean that bi (the point an-
tipodal to ai) is strictly in the open interval (β, γ), whereas by construction there
are no more points from A in this interval. Thus w.l.o.g. d(ai, β) < d(ai, α) <
d(ai, γ), and thus
d(ai, β) = d(ai, α)−d(α, β) = d(ai, α)−x; d(ai, γ) = d(ai, α)+d(α, γ) = d(ai, α)+y.
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We have that
ci(f
′(a),a) = pf ′(β)d(ai, β) + pf ′(γ)d(ai, γ) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α,β,γ}
pf ′(t)d(ai, t)
= (pf (β) + p
y
x+ y
)d(ai, β) + (pf (γ) + p
x
x+ y
)d(ai, γ) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α,β,γ}
pf (t)d(ai, t)
= p
y
x+ y
d(ai, β) + p
x
x+ y
d(ai, γ) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α}
pf(t)d(ai, t)
= p
y
x+ y
(d(ai, α)− x) + p x
x+ y
(d(ai, α) + y) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α}
pf(t)d(ai, t)
= p
y
x+ y
d(ai, α)− p y
x+ y
x+ p
x
x+ y
d(ai, α) + p
x
x+ y
y +
∑
t∈[m]\{α}
pf (t)d(ai, t)
= p
y
x+ y
d(ai, α) + p
x
x+ y
d(ai, α) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α}
pf (t)d(ai, t)
= pd(ai, α) +
∑
t∈[m]\{α}
pf(t)d(ai, t) =
∑
t∈[m]
pf (t)d(ai, t) = ci(f(a),a),
as required.
We remark that such a proof would not work for Conjecture 5, since it is possible
to construct mechanisms that use an antipodal point to balance incentives and
maintain strategyproofness. Our conjecture is thus that this can only improve
the social cost when the social cost is far from being optimal.
D General Graphs
Theorem 7. The PD mechanism is strategyproof in expectation for 3 agents in
any metric space (in particular on any graph).
a′1
a3 a1
a2
Figure 6: Example of a profile and a possible manipulation on a graph. All
edges have the length 1. The distances in profile a (before normalization) are
x = d(a1, a2) = 5, y = d(a2, a3) = 4, z = d(a1, a3) = 5. In the modified profile
a
′ = (a′1, a2, a3), the distances are x
′ = 7, z′ = 5, and ε = 3, α = −2, β = 0.
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Proof. Let f = fPD be the Proportional Distance mechanism. Consider a devi-
ation a′1 by agent 1 that results in the profile a
′ = (a′1, a2, a3), and denote the
new distances x′ = d(a′1, a2) and z
′ = d(a′1, a3). We normalize distances such
that y = 1. Denote ε = d(a1, a
′
1), α = x
′ − x and β = z′ − z (see Fig. 6 for an
example). By triangle inequality:
|α|, |β| ≤ ε (9)
|x− z| ≤ y = 1 (10)
The cost of truthful reporting by agent 1 is
c1(f(a)) = fa(a1)0 + fa(a2)x + fa(a3)z =
2xz
1 + x+ z
.
On the other hand, after reporting a′1, the cost is
c1(f(a
′)) = fa′(a′1)ε+fa′(a2)x+fa′(a3)z =
ε+ x′z + xz′
1 + x′ + z′
=
ε+ (x+ α)z + x(z + β)
1 + x+ z + α+ β
.
We need to show that c′1 − c1 ≥ 0. We begin as follows.
c1(f(a
′))−c1(f(a)) = (ε+ (x+ α)z + x(z + β))(1 + x+ z)− 2xz(1 + x+ z + α+ β)
(1 + x+ z)(1 + x+ z + α+ β)
.
Since the denominator is positive, we focus on the nominator. W.l.o.g. x ≥ z.
Denote δ = x− z and note that δ ∈ [0, 1].
c1(f(a
′))− c1(f(a)) =sign (ε+ (x + α)z + x(z + β))(1 + x+ z)− 2xz(1 + x+ z + α+ β)
= ε(1 + x+ z) + 2xz(1 + x+ z) + αz + αzx+ αz2 + βx+ βzx+ βx2
− 2xz(1 + x+ z)− 2αxz − 2βxz
= ε(1 + x+ z) + αz − αzx+ αz2 + βx − βzx+ βx2
= ε(1 + x+ z) + αz(1 + z − x) + βx(1 + x− z)
= ε(1 + 2z + δ) + αz(1− δ) + β(z + δ)(1 + δ)
Note that z(1− δ) and (z+ δ)(1+ δ) are nonnegative. Thus we can lower bound
the expression by taking the lower bound of α and β, which is −ε. Therefore
c1(f(a
′))− c1(f(a)) =sign ε(1 + 2z + δ) + αz(1− δ) + β(z + δ)(1 + δ)
≥ ε(1 + 2z + δ) + (−ε)z(1− δ) + (−ε)(z + δ)(1 + δ)
= ε(1 + 2z + δ − z + zδ − z − zδ − δ − δ2) = ε(1− δ2) ≥ 0,
as required. 
Proposition 15 The PD mechanism dominates the RD mechanism.
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Proof. W.l.o.g. x ≤ y ≤ z and x+ y + z = 1. Denote α = x− 13 , β = y − 13 , γ =
z − 13 , then α+ β + γ = 0 and α ≤ 0 ≤ γ.
SC(fPD(a)) = x(y + z) + y(x+ z) + z(x+ y) = (
1
3
+ α)(y + z) + (
1
3
+ β)(x + z) + (
1
3
+ γ)(x+ y)
= SC(fRD(a)) + (α+ β)z + (α+ γ)y + (β + γ)x
= SC(fRD(a))− γz + (α+ γ)y − αx = SC(fRD(a)) + γ(y − z) + α(y − x) ≤ SC(fRD(a)),
Since γ ≥ 0 ≥ y − z and α ≤ 0 ≤ y − x. The inequality is strict for any profile
where x < y < z. 
E Euclidean Spaces
We conclude the technical part of the paper with a contribution to the analysis
of deterministic mechanisms in Euclidean spaces, focusing mainly on 3 agents
in the plane.
Suppose that X is a convex subset of an Euclidean space RD with the ℓ2
norm. Every agent location ai is a vector (aij)j≤D .
The Multi-Median mechanism Consider the (deterministic) multi-median (MM)
mechanism, which takes the median independently on each dimension. That is,
fMM (a) = (x1, . . . , xD), where each xj is the median of (aij)i≤n (breaking ties
according to some fixed order).
The MM mechanism is strategyproof for the same reason that the (one-
dimensional) median is: an agent can only move the facility away from her own
location in each dimension.6
Proposition 16 The MM mechanism has an approximation ratio of at most√
D for any number of agents n.
Proof (Proof sketch). The proposition follows from the fact that the MM mech-
anism is optimal for the ℓ1 norm, and that switching from ℓ1 to ℓ2 may change
the norm of a vector by a factor of at most
√
D.
E.1 The 2-dimensional Plane
Remark 2. While I was working on this problem for three agents, Goel and Hann-
Caruthers [2019] solved the problem for any number of agents on the plane. They
showed that the tight approximation bound of the MM mechanism is
√
2
√
n2+1
n+1 ,
which entails
√
5
4
∼= 1.118 for n = 3 agents. I still report my findings as they
apply different techniques that may be of interest.
6 Note that in contrast to the one-dimensional median, the MM mechanism is not
group-strategyproof, as each agent may agree to suffer a small loss in one dimension
to gain more in another dimension.
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The point that minimizes the sum of distances to vertices of a triangle is
known as the Fermat (or Fermat-Torricelli) point. We use two known charac-
terizations of it in this section: a geometric characterization to prove a lower
bound, and an algebraic characterization for an upper bound.
D
Q
Z
C
B
A
1 1
1√
3
×
Figure 7: A profile where an agent located in C has a manipulation in the opti-
mal mechanism. This is also the profile where the multi-median obtains its worst
approximation ratio in Case Ib (× marks the output of the MM mechanism).
It is known that MM is the only deterministic strategyproof mechanism that
is also Pareto optimal and anonymous, and this is true for any odd number of
agent in the plane [Peters et al., 1992]. Since the optimal mechanism is in partic-
ular Pareto optimal and anonymous, it cannot be strategyproof. Yet, we are not
aware of an explicit lower bound on the approximation ratio of (deterministic)
strategyproof mechanisms.
Proposition 17 The optimal mechanism for 3 agents in the plane is not strat-
egyproof. Further, any deterministic strategyproof mechanism has an approxima-
tion ratio strictly above 1.0002.
Proof (Proof sketch). Our proof relies on a known geometric characterization of
the Fermat point z∗ in a triangle ABC:7
– In triangles with some obtuse angle of 120◦ or more, z∗ is simply the vertex
on the obtuse angle, and thus SC(z∗) is the sum of the two shorter edges.
In other triangles, the Fermat point can be found as follows.
– Consider some edge of the original triangle ABC (say AB), the equilateral
triangle ABD built on the other side of AB, and its escribed circle whose
center is the point Q. Consider the arc of the circle that intersects AB (the
dotted arc in Fig. 7), and denote by Z the area enclosed by the arc and the
edge AB.
– If C is outside the area Z, then the Fermat point is the intersection of the
line CD with the dotted arc. If C is inside Z, then C forms an angle of at
least 120◦ and becomes the Fermat point itself.
7 See solution 6 here: http://www.cut-the-knot.org/Generalization/fermat_point.shtml
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metric space Any Plane Circle Tree/Line
UB 2 (dictator) 1.118 (MM, Thm. 18) 2 (dictator) 1 (median)
LB 2 (*) > 1 (Prop. 17) 2 (*) 1
Table 2: A summary of approximation bounds for 3-agent deterministic mech-
anisms. (*) - from [Dokow et al., 2012, Schummer and Vohra, 2004].
Now, consider a profile where a1 = A, a2 = B. Agent 3 can set the Fermat
point to be anywhere in the slice Z. When a3 = C, as in the figure, then the
Fermat point is B. However, clearly B is not the closest point to a3 = C in
the slice Z. The closest point is the intersection I of the thin line CQ with the
dotted arc, so reporting a′3 = I would also move the Fermat point to I, and thus
be a manipulation for agent 3.
We can further extend the proof above to give an explicit lower bound (of
1.0002) on the approximation ratio of any deterministic strategyproof mecha-
nism: to get a better approximation ratio, the selected point in profile ABC
must be close to the Fermat point B, and in profile ABI must be close to the
Fermat point I. For an approximation of 1.0002 or better, the location of the
facility in profiles ABC and ABI must be disjoint. However then moving agent 3
from C to I would still be a manipulation, as shown above.
This raises the question of the best approximation ratio that can be guar-
anteed, even with deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. In the plane D = 2,
so Prop. 16 provides us with an approximation ratio of
√
2 ∼= 1.41, which is
somewhat better than the approximation of RD (2 − 2n )—but only for n ≥ 4.
We still need to show that the multi-median beats 43 for n = 3 as well.
Theorem 18. For n = 3 agents in the plane, the multi-median mechanism has
a worst-case approximation ratio of
√
5
4
∼= 1.118, and this bound is tight.
Proof. Note that the MM mechanism is invariant to translation, scaling, rota-
tion at right angles, and mirroring of agents’ locations. Thus given any profile
(a1, a2, a3), w.l.o.g. the order along the horizontal axis is a3, a2, a1 (with a2
strictly to the right of a3) and along the vertical axis a2 is weakly above a3. We
the translate a3 to C = (0, 0), and scale everything such that a2 is mapped to
B = (1, x) for some x ≥ 0. The last point a1 is mapped to some A = (1+ y,−z)
where y ≥ 0.
We can thus describe any profile a ∈ X 3 (up to translation, scaling, and
mirroring) using the three parameters x, y, z. We refer to the case where z > 0
as Case I, and to z ≤ 0 as Case II.
We denote a = d(BC), b = d(AC) and c = d(AB). See Fig. 8 for an example.
Case I. The lengths of the three edges are
(i) a =
√
1 + x2; (ii) b =
√
y2 + (z + x)2; (iii) c =
√
z2 + (1 + y)2.
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C
B
A
1 y
x
z
a
b
c
×
∗
γ
90◦ − α
α β
Figure 8: Above, the triangle defined by x = 58 , y =
1
2 , z =
1
2 . The output of
the MM mechanism x∗ and the Fermat-Torricelli point z∗ are marked by × and
∗, respectively.
By the way we constructed the triangle, B provides the median on axis 1, and
C provides the median on axis 2, thus the multi-median is the point x∗ = (1, 0).
It is easy to compute SC(x∗) = d(A,x∗)+d(B,x∗)+d(C,x∗) =
√
y2 + z2+
x+1. Recall that in triangles with some obtuse angle of 120◦ or more (case Ia), z∗
is simply the vertex on the obtuse angle, and thus SC(z∗) is the sum of the two
shorter edges. For Case 1a, if we assume symmetry, we get (by taking derivative
w.r.t. x) that the worst case for the isosceles triangle is x = 0.5, y = 1, z = 0
(in particular the obtuse angle is strictly more than 120◦).8 Then SC(x∗) = 2.5
and SC(z∗) = 2
√
1.25, so we get an approximation ratio of
2.5
2
√
1.25
=
2.5√
5
=
2.5
√
5
5
=
2
√
5
4
=
√
20
16
∼= 1.118.
It is easy to verify that breaking the symmetry of the triangle will only
improve the approximation ratio.
In other triangles (case Ib), we get the following unattractive expression based
on an algebraic characterization of z∗:9
SC(z∗)2 =
1
2
(
a
2 + b2 + c2 +
√
3(a+ b+ c)(−a+ b+ c)(a− b+ c)(a+ b− c)
)
.
We solve this case using computer optimization. We need to constrain the
values of x, y, z so as to avoid angles larger than 120◦. Denote α , ∠CBx∗, β ,
∠ABx∗, γ , ∠ACx∗ (see Fig. 8). We have that
(iv) tanα =
1
x
; (v) tanβ =
y
x+ z
; (vi) tan γ =
z
1 + y
.
8 I thank Wade Hann-Caruthers for helping pointing out a mistake in the original
analysis.
9 We could not find this explicit expression in published literature, however a short
proof is given by Quang Hoang in StackExchange [Hoang, 2016].
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Angle ∠CAB can never be obtuse, so we only need the constraints on angles
∠ABC and ∠ACB:
(I) α+ β ≤ 120◦; (II) 90◦ − α+ γ ≤ 120◦.
To find the worst instance, we need to maximize
SC(x∗)
SC(z∗)
=
√
y2 + z2 + x + 1√
1
2
(
a2 + b2 + c2 +
√
3(a+ b + c)(−a+ b + c)(a− b+ c)(a+ b− c)
) ,
subject to the equalities (i) − (vi), inequalities (I), (II), and non-negativity
of x, y, z. Since a and b are bounded from 0, all derivatives in x, y and z are
bounded. We used grid search to verify that the maximum is obtained at x =
1√
3
, y = 1, z = 0. This is an isosceles triangle with a sharper angle than in Case Ia
(exactly 120◦) so the approximation ratio is strictly better.
Case II. If z is negative, we rotate the triangle 90◦ counterclockwise, and scale
down by a factor of x. Then we are back at case I, where the vertices switch
roles.
Note that by using randomization, we are likely to get a certain improvement.
For example, we can select the axes according to a random rotation, and then run
the multi-median mechanism.We leave the analysis of such mechanisms to future
work. It is an open question e.g. whether some “random rotation multi-median”
has a constant approximation ratio in high dimensions.
